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LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981) calculated the time series for asset prices
using the simple present value formula — the current price of an asset is equal to the
expected discounted present value of its future dividends. Using a constant interest
rate to discount the future, they showed that the variance of the observed prices
for U.S. equity exceeds the variance implied by the present value formula (see ﬁgure
1 ) . T h i si st h eexcess volatility puzzle. Equilibrium models of asset pricing deliver
a generalized version of the present value formula. In Lucas (1978), for instance,
the discount factor is stochastic and depends on the intertemporal marginal rate
of substitution (IMRS) of the representative consumer. There have been several
attempts to explain the excess volatility puzzle. LeRoy and LaCivita (1981) and
Michener (1982) examine the role of risk aversion. Flavin (1983) and Kleidon (1986)
examine whether small sample bias can statistically account for violations of the
variance bound. Marsh and Merton (1986) try to resolve the puzzle with diﬀerent
statistical assumptions on the dividend process.1 Shiller (1984) and Ingram (1990)
explore whether the existence of rule-of-thumb traders can account for the excess
volatility.
In related work, Mehra and Prescott (1985) showed that for reasonable values
of risk aversion the Lucas asset pricing model cannot reproduce the observed equity
premium. This is the equity premium puzzle. Resolutions of the equity premium
puzzle have followed two distinct paths. One approach was to retain the complete
frictionless markets framework of Lucas, but abandon the separability assumptions
in the preferences. Prominent examples of this approach are Weil (1989) and Epstein
and Zin (1991), who use state non-separable preferences, and Constantinides (1990),
who uses time non-separable preferences. The second approach to resolving the equity
1West (1988) develops a volatility test that circumvents the above small sample
bias and dividend process criticisms and shows that the observed stock prices are
indeed too volatile.
1premium puzzle abandons the complete frictionless markets framework.2 Aiyagari
(1993), Lucas (1994) and Heaton and Lucas (1996) are examples of this approach.
The frictions in these models include uninsured idiosyncratic risks and transaction
costs.
This paper follows the frictions approach. Our purpose is to examine the quanti-
tative eﬀect of search frictions in product markets on asset prices. We combine several
features from Shi (1997) and Lagos and Wright (2002) in a model without money.
Households prefer special goods and general goods. Special goods can be obtained
only via trade in decentralized markets. This trading process involves search and
bargaining. Similar to Shi and Lagos-Wright, the search frictions make intertemporal
trade infeasible in our model. General goods can be obtained via trade in centralized
competitive markets and via ownership of an asset. There is only one asset in our
model and that is similar to a Lucas tree that yields fruits that can be consumed
directly. The asset is also used as a medium of exchange in the decentralized market
to obtain the special goods. The value of the asset in facilitating transactions in the
decentralized market is determined endogenously.3 If we shut down the decentralized
trading process (i.e., special goods and search frictions), then our model is identical
to that of Lucas (1978).
With only one asset, our model cannot address the equity premium puzzle, but
we provide parameters for which the model delivers the average rate of return on
equity and the volatility of equity price. It turns that the Lucas model can deliver
the average rate of return on equity for reasonable values of risk aversion, but it
cannot simultaneously deliver the volatility. The price-dividend ratio implied by the
m o d e li sh i g hr e l a t i v et ot h ed a t aw h i l ef o rt h es a m er i s ka v e r s i o nt h eL u c a sm o d e l
underpredicts the price-dividend ratio. When we calibrate the model to deliver the
2Mehra and Prescott (1985) suggest this approach in their concluding remarks —
“Perhaps introducing some features that make certain types of intertemporal trades
among agents infeasible will resolve the puzzle.”
3See Bansal and Coleman (1996) for a reduced form model of the transaction role
of assets and its implications for asset returns.
2observed price-dividend ratio, the implied value for the medium of exchange role of
the asset is on average 14.3% above the Lucas model.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In the next section we set up the
economic environment and derive the equilibrium asset pricing equation. In section
3, we study the quantitative implications of the model.
2T h e E n v i r o n m e n t
Consider a discrete-time non-monetary economy with special goods and general goods,
decentralized day markets and centralized night markets, and aggregate uncertainty.
The special and general goods and the day and night markets are similar to Lagos
and Wright (2002). There are H ≥ 3 types of households and there is a continuum of
households in each type. The type size is normalized to one. A type h household con-
sumes only good h but produces only good h+1. The utility from consuming c units
of the special good is u(c). The utility function is increasing and strictly concave, and
satisﬁes u(0) = 0, u0(0) = ∞ and u0(∞)=0 .T op r o d u c eq units of the special good,
households incur q units of disutility. The special goods are non-storable between
periods.
There is an inﬁnitely lived asset (Lucas tree) in this economy that yields dividends
(fruits) each period. Fruits are general goods and they follow an exogenous stationary
stochastic process. The utility from consuming d units of fruits is U(d),w h e r eU(·)
is increasing and strictly concave. Note that there is no cost to producing the fruits.
The fruits are also perishable. Each household is initially endowed with one (divisible)
tree.
Special goods are exchanged in a decentralized market in daytime where agents
meet in pairs randomly, as in standard search theory. The random matching technol-
ogy combined with the household preferences rules out barter in pairwise meetings.
Furthermore, there is no public record of transactions to support any credit arrange-
3ments. Thus, in pairwise meetings special goods are exchanged for trees. General
goods are available for trade only in the centralized market at night. The night
market is frictionless and trees are exchanged for general goods at the competitive
equilibrium price p.
Time is indexed by t =0 ,1,...The discount factor between periods is β.T h e r ei s
no discounting between day and night.
Random matching during the day will typically result in non-degenerate distrib-
utions of asset holdings. In order to maintain tractability, we use the device of large
households along the lines of Shi (1997). Each household consists of a continuum
of worker-shopper (or, seller-buyer) pairs. Buyers cannot produce the special good,
only sellers are capable of production. We assume the fraction of buyers = fraction of
sellers = 1
2.L e tα = 1
H. Then, the probability of single coincidence meetings during
the day is 1
4α. Each household sends its buyers to the decentralized day market with
take-it-or-leave-it instructions (q,s) — accept q u n i t so fs p e c i a lg o o d si ne x c h a n g ef o r
s trees. Each household also sends its sellers with “accept” or “reject” instructions.
There is no communication between buyers and sellers of the same household during
the day. After the buyers and sellers ﬁnish trading in the day, the household pools
t h et r e e sa n ds h a r e st h es p e c i a lg o o d sa c r o s si t sm e m b e r se a c hp e r i o d .B yt h el a wo f
large numbers, the distribution of trees and special goods are degenerate across house-
holds. This allows us to focus on the representative household. The representative
household consumption of the special good is α
4q.
2.1 Timing of events in each period
• The representative household starts the period with a trees.
• It observes the aggregate state d (fruits per tree), but the fruits are not available
for trade during the day.
• The household determines the take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer (q,s). It allocates s trees
4to each buyer in the household and provides trading instructions to its sellers
and buyers.
• The sellers and buyers from households of all types are randomly matched in
the decentralized market. In single coincidence meetings, the sellers produce
the special good in exchange for trees from the buyers.
• Each household then pools its purchases and consumes the special goods.
• Next, each household enters the centralized market at night with its new asset
balance and fruits. Households trade fruits and trees in the centralized com-
petitive asset market (much like the standard consumption based asset pricing
model) at price p.
• Then, they consume the fruits and end the period with a0 trees.
2.2 Optimization
We begin with the representative household’s instructions to its buyers and sellers.
Clearly, if a member of the household is not in a single coincidence meeting, the in-
struction is not to trade. The instruction to the buyers in single coincidence meetings
is a the take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer (q,s). For another household’s seller to be indiﬀerent
between accepting and rejecting the buyer’s oﬀer in the random match, (q,s)h a st o
satisfy the seller’s participation constraint:
Ωs − q =0 , (1)
where Ω is the other household’s valuation of the asset. The ﬁrst term on the left
hand side is the gain to the seller from obtaining s trees in the trade. The second
term is the disutility from q units of the special good. The take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer will
leave no surplus for the seller, so the right hand side is 0 (since u(0) = 0). We will
assume that the seller will accept the oﬀer whenever he is indiﬀerent. An additional
5restriction on the oﬀer is that the total number of trees allocated to the buyers by
the representative household cannot exceed the number of trees that the household
started the period with:
1
2
s ≤ a.( 2 )
This is because (i) the decentralized market does not support credit arrangements,
so the buyer cannot short-sell the asset and (ii) the buyer is temporarily separated
from other members of the household, so he cannot borrow from the other members
of the household. We can eliminate s by combining the two constraints (1) and (2):
1
2
³ q
Ω
´
≤ a.
The representative household’s instruction to its sellers in single coincidence meet-
ings are straightforward. Suppose that the buyer from the other household oﬀers
(Q,S). The instruction is, if the surplus from (Q,S) is non-negative, accept the oﬀer
and produce Q units of the special good; otherwise, reject the oﬀer and do not trade.
The representative household’s problem then is described by the following dynamic
program:
v(a,d)=m a x
q,x,a0u
³α
4
q
´
−
α
4
Q + U(x)+βEd0|dv(a
0,d
0) (3)
s. t.
1
2
³ q
Ω
´
≤ a (4)
x + pa
0 =
n
a +
α
4
S −
α
4
³ q
Ω
´o
(p + d),( 5 )
where Q is the amount of the special good obtained by the buyers from other house-
holds and S is the number of trees obtained by the sellers from other households.
The second constraint is the wealth constraint for the household. Note that p is the
relative price a tree in terms of the fruits in the centralized night market.
Remark 1 If α =0(i.e., no search frictions or special goods), then our model is
identical to that of Lucas (1978). In this case, the asset has positive value since
it yields dividends. The presence of search frictions (α>0) implies an additional
“liquidity” value to the asset.
6Uniqueness, concavity and diﬀerentiability of v(·) follows from theorems 9.6, 9.7,
and 9.8 in Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989).
2.3 Equilibrium
Deﬁnition 2 An equilibrium consists of a sequence {qt,x t,s t,a t+1}
∞
t=0 , given initial
asset holdings, such that
1. Given other households’ oﬀers and valuations, each household’s choices solve
the dynamic program (3);
2. The choices and the asset valuations are the same across households;
3. The centralized markets clear for all t: xt = dt,a t+1 =1 .
Let α
2λ be the multiplier on the constraint (4). The ﬁrst order conditions for the
representative household with respect to q and a0 a r ea sf o l l o w s .
u
0(
α
4
q)=
1
Ω
{(p + d)U
0(x)+λ} (6)
pU
0(x)=βEd0|d
∂v(a0,d 0)
∂a0 (7)
In these conditions, we have used the wealth constraint (5) to substitute for x.N o t e
that if the no-short-sales constraint (4) does not bind, then λ =0 .T h e e n v e l o p e
condition for a implies that
∂v(a,d)
∂a
=( p + d)U
0 (x)+
α
2
λ (8)
Using (6) to substitute for λ in (8), we get
∂v(a,d)
∂a
=
³
1 −
α
2
´
(p + d)U
0 (x)+
α
2
u
0
³α
4
q
´
Ω.
We can rewrite (7) using the above expression for ∂v
∂a:
pU
0(x)=βEd0|d
n³
1 −
α
2
´
(p
0 + d
0)U
0 (x
0)+
α
2
u
0
³α
4
q
0
´
Ω
0
o
.( 9 )
7We have to now impose the equilibrium conditions on (9). The valuation of the
asset, Ω, by other households in the decentralized market during the day, has to equal
the valuation, ω, by the representative household, in equilibrium. We can determine
ω as follows. An additional unit of asset obtained in the decentralized market yields
d fruits at night; the asset can also be sold for p fruits in the centralized market at
night. On the margin these additional fruits are valued at U0(x). In equilibrium, the
general goods market clearing at night implies x = d. Hence,
ω = Ω =( p + d)U
0 (d).
Using the equilibrium values for Ω and x, we can write (9) as
pU
0(d)=βEd0|d
n
(p
0 + d
0)U
0 (d
0)
h
1 −
α
2
+
α
2
u
0
³α
4
q
0
´io
.
Hence, the equilibrium sequence of asset prices satisfy
ptU
0(dt)=βEt
n
(pt+1 + dt+1)U
0 (dt+1)
h
1 −
α
2
+
α
2
u
0
³α
4
qt+1
´io
.( 1 0 )
Again, note that if α =0 , then the above asset pricing equation is identical to that
of Lucas (1978). In the presence of search frictions, the price in the competitive asset
market accounts for the future liquidity value of the asset as well.4
To solve for the equilibrium sequence {qt}, we have to account for two possible
scenarios. If the constraint (4) does not bind in period t,t h e nλt equals zero and
u0(α
4qt)=1 . Denote the solution to this equation as q∗. Note that the solution does
not depend on the aggregate state and, hence, is time-invariant. Furthermore, if qt =
q∗ for all t, then the search frictions are irrelevant for the asset pricing implications
and the price sequence in our model is the same as in Lucas (1978). If the constraint
(4) binds in period t,t h e n
qt =2( pt + dt)U
0 (dt). (11)
4Vayanos and Wang (2002), Duﬃe, Garleanu and Pedersen (2003) and Weill (2003)
consider search frictions in the asset market and present models of liquidity premium.
83 Quantitative Implications
To examine the quantitative implications of our model, we restrict the utility functions
to be of the CRRA class,
u(c)=
c1−σ
1 − σ
U (x)=
x1−δ
1 − δ
where 0 <σ<1 and 0 <δ<∞ are the coeﬃcients of relative risk aversion. Hence,
q∗ i st h eu n i q u es o l u t i o nt o
¡
α
4q
¢−σ =1 .
When the no-short-sales constraint (4) binds, q =2 ( p+d)d−δ. In our computation
later we will assume that the constraint (4) binds for all t. Thus, we combine (10)
and (11) and write the asset pricing equation for these functional forms as
ptd
−δ
t = βEt
½
(pt+1 + dt+1)d
−δ
t+1
∙
1 −
α
2
+
α
2
nα
2
(pt+1 + dt+1)d
−δ
t+1
o−σ¸¾
. (12)
With the equilibrium values for the price sequence we can compute the quantities
{qt} and we will verify ex-post whether the constraint (4) is indeed binding for all
periods.
3.1 Numerical method
To compute the price sequence, we follow the Monte Carlo simulation method pro-
posed by Judd (1998). Since we need to generate the sequence of prices over sample
period, we compute the asset price in each period given the realized data up to that
period instead of the pricing function.
First rewrite the pricing equation (12) as
pt = βEt
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
¡
1 − α
2
¢³
dt+1
dt
´−δ
(pt+1 + dt+1)
+
¡
α
2
¢1−σ dσδ
t+1
³
dt+1
dt
´−δ
(pt+1 + dt+1)
1−σ
⎫
⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎭
. (13)
Since the current price is a non-linear function of future prices for σ ∈ (0,1),i ti s
diﬃcult to write the current price as a function of expected future dividend streams.
9We overcome this problem by approximating part of the pricing equation. The
term (pt+1 + dt+1)
1−σ c a nb ew r i t t e na s(pt+1/dt+1 +1 )
1−σ d
1−σ
t+1 , and we linearize
(pt+1/dt+1 +1 )
1−σ around its mean w +1 .T h e ﬁrst order Taylor expansion of
(pt+1/dt+1 +1 )
1−σ is:
µ
pt+1
dt+1
+1
¶1−σ
≈ (1 − σ)(w +1 )
−σ
µ
pt+1
dt+1
+1
¶
+ σ(w +1 )
1−σ . (14)
(The mean price-dividend ratio, w,i s22.75 in our sample.) Plug (14) into (13) to
obtain
pt = βEt
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
(pt+1 + dt+1)
³
1 − α
2 +( 1− σ)
¡
α
2
¢1−σ (w +1 )
−σ d
σδ−σ
t+1
´³
dt+1
dt
´−δ
+σ
¡
α
2
¢1−σ (w +1 )
1−σ d
1+σδ−σ
t+1
³
dt+1
dt
´−δ
⎫
⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎭
.
(15)
Let
Ft+1 =1 −
α
2
+( 1− σ)
³α
2
´1−σ
(w +1 )
−σ d
σδ−σ
t+1
Gt+1 = σ
³α
2
´1−σ
(w +1 )
1−σ d
1+σδ−σ
t+1
so (15) becomes
pt = βEt
(
[(pt+1 + dt+1)Ft+1 + Gt+1]
µ
dt+1
dt
¶−δ)
. (16)
The no-bubbles solution can be obtained by repeated substitution of prices using (16)
i.e.,
pt = Et
∞ X
j=1
β
j
(µ
dt+j
dt
¶−δ "Ã
j Y
i=1
Ft+i
!
dt+j +
Ã
j Y
i=1
Ft+i−1
!
Gt+j
#)
. (17)
where Ft is deﬁned to be 1.
Given the price sequence {pt}, we can calculate the asset returns by
Rt+1 =
pt+1 + dt+1
pt
.
10The key problem now is to calculate the expectation in (17). This can be done
by estimating the stochastic process for dividend assuming the dividend is trend
stationary and simulating the sequence of dividends.5 (See Figure 2.)
1. Assume that the log of dividends follows a trend stationary process:
lndt+1 = b0 + b1 lndt + b2t + ηt+1 (18)
where ηt+1 is the disturbance with mean 0.
2. For each period t,u s ed a t ai np e r i o dt a st h ei n i t i a lv a l u et os i m u l a t eat i m e
series for dividends of length 200. That is, generate a sequence dt+j,j=
1,...,200 using the coeﬃcients in (18) and drawing the disturbances ηt from its
empirical distribution. (An alternative is to draw these disturbances under the
assumption that η is normally distributed.) Plug the appropriate values into
(17) to calculate
200 X
j=1
β
j
(µ
dt+j
dt
¶1−δ "Ã
j Y
i=1
Ft+i
!
dt+j +
Ã
j Y
i=1
Ft+i−1
!
Gt+j
#)
.
3. Repeat step 2 many times. The number of replications we use is 1000.T h e
average value of these 1000 calculations is pt.
4. Repeat step 2 and 3 for periods t +1 ,t+2 ,..., until the end of sample period.
Using the time series of p calculated from above steps, we can compute the rate of
return sequence {Rt+1} for the whole sample period. This will allow us to calculate the
unconditional moments of prices and returns. Two issues about this calculation are
worth noting. The ﬁrst is whether the bubble term will indeed converge to zero. The
parameters we use in the following sections will satisfy this requirement. The product
β
200
³
dt+200
dt
´−δ ³Q200
j=1 Ft+j
´
is very close to zero and, hence, a time series of length
200 provides a good approximation for the inﬁnite sum in (17). The second issue is
5See DeJong and Whiteman (1991) for evidence on trend stationarity.
11the number of replications used to calculate the expectation. When we quadruple the
number of replications to 4000, our results are unchanged.
3.2 Data and Parameters
The data are all in real terms and obtained from Shiller’s website. The sample period
is 1871-1995. We measure the asset prices and dividends by the S&P 500 prices
and per capita dividends. We measure the volatility of a variable by the standard
deviation of the detrended time series of the variable. The average rate of return
on equity in this sample is 8% and the standard deviation of the equity price is 81.
The mean growth rate of dividend is 1.91% and the standard deviation of detrended
dividend is 1.61.
Other than the coeﬃcients in the trend stationary process, we have three pref-
erence parameters, σ,δ, and β, and one parameter α that describes the extent of
departure from the standard asset pricing model. The estimates of the coeﬃcients
are
b0 =0 .308
b1 =0 .802
b2 =0 .002
and the variance of η is 0.0136.
We set β =0 .96. We searched for α, σ and δ to match the observed average
rate of return on equity and standard deviation of the asset price. There are several
restrictions on these parameters. Recall that we have assumed u(0) = 0, so σ must be
less than 1. The number of types of special goods in our model is assumed to be 3 or
more (H ≥ 3), so α ≤ 1
3. Finally, we have assumed that the no-short-sales constraint
binds, so we have to verify that our equilibrium quantities and prices satisfy (11).
123.3 Results
For the benchmark parameters in the table below the average rate of return on the
asset is 8% and the standard deviation of the asset price is 84.
Table 1. Benchmark Parameters
β α σ δ
0.96 0.03 0.11 3.0
Recall that the mean return in the data is 8% and the standard deviation of the asset
price is 81.I n ﬁgure 3, we illustrate the equilibrium price sequence implied by the
model. In ﬁgure 4 we illustrate the price-dividend ratio. The mean price-dividend
ratio in the data is 22.75 while the model implies a mean of 26.
In ﬁgures 5 and 6, we plot the price sequence implied by the model as we vary the
parameters σ and α. (The other parameters β and δ are ﬁxed at their benchmark
values.) Changes in σ aﬀect the curvature of the utility function associated with the
special consumption good. As σ increases, the asset price volatility increases. As we
move farther away from the standard frictionless asset pricing model (increase in α),
the asset price volatility increases. The price-dividend ratio exhibits a similar pattern.
Figures 7, 8 and 9 illustrate the eﬀects of σ and α on the average rate of return, the
volatility and the price-dividend ratio. The table below present a summary of the
comparative dynamics associated with changes in σ and α.
13Table 2. Comparative dynamics (β =0 .96 and δ =3 )
Average rate of return (%)
σ
α 0.05 0.10 0.13 0.15
0.01 8.96 8.71 8.53 8.39
0.03 8.70 8.19 7.85 7.63
0.05 8.51 7.82 7.45 7.31
0.10 8.13 7.33 7.75 8.99
Std. deviation of the asset price
σ
α 0.05 0.10 0.13 0.15
0.01 62.2 66.8 70.9 74.5
0.03 66.9 80.2 93.7 108
0.05 71.4 95.3 126 173
0.10 82.8 158 662 6000
Mean Price-dividend ratio
σ
α 0.05 0.10 0.13 0.15
0.01 20.8 22.1 23.3 24.3
0.03 22.2 26.0 29.8 33.6
0.05 23.5 30.2 38.5 49.9
0.10 26.8 46.6 127 639
The standard asset pricing model (α =0 ) delivers the observed average rate of
return on equity for risk aversion δ =2 .65.I nﬁg u r e1 0 ,w ep l o tt h ep r i c es e q u e n c e
for this case. The standard deviation of the asset price, however, is 53 while the
observed volatility is 81.I n ﬁgure 11, we illustrate the price-dividend ratio. The
mean price-dividend ratio implied by the standard asset pricing model is 20.7 while
t h eo b s e r v e dm e a ni s22.75. Changes in δ aﬀe c tt h ep r i c es e q u e n c ea ss h o w ni nﬁgure
12. As α approaches zero in our model, the average rate of return and the volatility
in our model approach the values in the Lucas model.
It is clear from comparing the price-dividend ratio in ﬁg u r e4t ot h a ti nﬁgure 11
that the asset in our model has a signiﬁcant value as the medium of exchange. To
compute the “liquidity premium” of the asset, we calibrate the model to match the
observed mean price-dividend ratio. Holding β,α and δ at their benchmark values,
when we decrease σ to 0.06, the mean price-divided ratio implied by the model is the
14same as in the data. These new parameters imply an average equity return of 8.6%
and a price volatility of 69. We then calculate the asset prices for a model with α =0
and β and δ set at their benchmark values. This is, of course, the standard asset
pricing model. (Note from (12) that the value of σ is irrelevant for this calculation.)
Since the standard model does not assign any medium of exchange role to the asset,
the diﬀerence between the prices implied by the two models would be the premium
paid for liquidity. The mean price-dividend ratio in the standard model is 20.I n
ﬁgure 13, we illustrate the liquidity premium as a fraction of the price implied by the
standard model i.e., liquidity premium =
Pmodel − PLucas
PLucas . The mean liquidity premium
implied by the model with search frictions is 14.3%.
3.3.1 The Hansen-Jagannathan Bound
In this section we examine whether the IMRS in our model satisﬁes the Hansen and
Jagannathan (1991) bound. Hansen and Jagannathan proposed a test that generalizes
the variance bounds developed by LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981). They
used asset return data to derive a lower bound on the volatility of a representative
household’s IMRS. An asset pricing model is said to be consistent with the data if
the volatility of the IMRS implied by the model is greater than the HJ bound. To
derive the bound, Hansen and Jagannathan projected the model IMRS onto a space
of contemporaneous asset returns and utilized only a necessary condition associated
with dynamic models, namely the intertemporal Euler equation. For instance, in the
Lucas model, the unconditional version of the Euler equation can be written as
ERt+1mt+1 =1 ,
where Rt+1 =
pt+1 + dt+1
pt
and mt+1 = β
µ
dt+1
dt
¶−δ
.
To compute the HJ bound for the case of 1 risky asset, consider the least squares
projection of the IMRS onto the linear space spanned by a constant and contempo-
15raneous returns. The projection is of the form
m = Em+( R − ER)θ + ν,
where Em is the mean of the model IMRS and ER is the mean asset return. The
projection error ν is orthogonal to the constant as well as contemporaneous returns,
so ERν =0 , and Eν =0 . Hence,
var(m)=θ
2var(R)+var(ν)
≥ θ
2var(R).
(The notation var(x) refers to variance of x.) The projection coeﬃcient θ =
Cov(R,m)
var(R) ,
where the numerator is the contemporaneous covariance between R and m.W ec a n
rewrite θ = ERm−EmER
var(R) . The Euler equation then implies θ = 1−EmER
var(R) . Satisfying the
HJ bound amounts to verifying whether
var(m) ≥
(1 − EmER)2
var(R)
, or
std(m) ≥
1 − EmER
std(R)
for the chosen preference parameters and observed dividend data.
He and Modest (1995) and Luttmer (1996) showed that the presence of frictions
alters the HJ bound. The unconditional version of the Euler equation could be, for
instance,
ERt+1mt+1 = ψ<1.
In this case, the lower bound on the volatility of the IMRS is
ψ−EmER
std(R) .T h e y t h e n
choose the value of ψ that minimizes the volatility bound. Clearly, such a strategy
assumes that ψ does not depend on the model parameters. The environment described
in section 2 suggests a diﬀerent approach. Suppose that we can measure the medium
of exchange transactions q. The asset pricing equation (10) can be written as
E
½µ
pt+1 + dt+1
pt
¶
β
U0 (dt+1)
U0(dt)
h
1 −
α
2
+
α
2
u
0
³α
4
qt+1
´i¾
=1 .
16Rewrite this equation in the familiar form
ERt+1mt+1 =1 ,
where Rt+1 =
pt+1 + dt+1
pt
and
mt+1 = β
U0 (dt+1)
U0(dt)
h
1 −
α
2
+
α
2
u
0
³α
4
qt+1
´i
.
The HJ bound then is 1−EmER
std(R) ,e x a c t l yt h es a m ea si nt h ec a s ew i t h o u tf r i c t i o n s .
H o w e v e r ,t h eI M R Si sv e r yd i ﬀerent.
4C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we consider an environment with search frictions in the goods market.
The asset in our model is used to facilitate trading in the goods market. This transac-
tion role makes the asset pricing implications of our model diﬀerent from those in the
standard asset pricing model. We show that a “small” departure from the standard
asset pricing model can simultaneously deliver the observed average rate of return on
equity and the volatility of the asset price.
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